作　　者： ;

机构地区： 暨南大学法学院

出　　处： 《河北法学》 2006年第1期26-30,共5页

摘　　要： 经营者因利益冲突而寻租,经营者自定薪酬大行其道,致使年薪制在实践中背离其设计目标。程序公正成为控制经营者自定薪酬的关键,这就要求提高经营者薪酬透明度;通过排除“灰色董事”和引入商事判断规则,超越董事会潜规则,增强利益冲突隔离机制的有效性;股东大会的事前控制应定位于薪酬政策和长期激励方案,并通过引入股东提案权和代表诉讼机制,强化股东对经营者薪酬的事后监督。 The executive＇s rent extraction due to eonfiiet of interest results in widespread selL dealing in executive remuneration, and annual remuneration package＇ s deviation from the goal of its design in practice, The procedural justice is critical to the control of self-dealing in executive remuneration. While enhancing executive remuneration transparency is the basis, it is of pressing necessity to improve the effectiveness of Chinese Wall for segregating such conflict of interest by excluding “gray directors” ,and overcoming boardroom norm through the adoption of business judgment rule. The AGM＇ s prior monitoring shall aim at the executive remuneration policy and long-term incentive scheme, and the shareholder＇ s post monitoring through shareholder proposal and derivative action shall be put into place.

关 键 词： 经营者 薪酬委员会 股东监督机制 股东提案权 股东代表诉讼机制 中国 公司法

领　　域： [政治法律—经济法学] [政治法律—法学]