作　　者： ; (宋献中）;

机构地区： 暨南大学管理学院

出　　处： 《经济与管理研究》 2011年第11期68-76,共9页

摘　　要： 本文以控制权和现金流权的差值衡量大股东和中小股东的代理冲突,以最终控制人的产权性质作为分类标准,论述了不同产权性质企业的代理冲突对企业投资行为的影响。研究发现,国有企业大股东与中小股东的代理冲突与企业投资显著正相关,中央企业大股东和中小股东的代理冲突与企业投资正相关但不显著,地方企业大股东和中小股东的代理冲突与企业投资显著正相关。民营企业上市公司大股东与中小股东的代理冲突与企业投资负相关但不显著。当控制了负债融资约束这一变量之后,不受负债融资约束的民营企业大股东与中小股东代理冲突与企业投资显著正相关,该结果表明了代理冲突"激励"企业投资受制于企业负债融资能力。 This paper takes the divergence of control rights and cash flow rights as the variable of agency cost between control shareholders and minority shareholders, takes the standards and discusses that the companies with different property nature of ultimate shareholders as the classification property nature have different relationships of corporate invest- ment and agency costs. The results are as following ： the agency cost in state - owned companies has positive relation with investment, the agency cost of control shareholders and minority shareholders in central government controlled companies has insignificant positive relation with investment while the agency cost in local government controlled companies has the significant positive relation with investment. At the meanwhile, the agency cost in private companies has insignificant neg- ative relation with investment. After controlled the debt financing constraints, the agency cost has significant positive relation with investment in unconstraint companies,which indicates agency cost influencing investment is limited by corporate debt capacity.

关 键 词： 产权性质 控制权和现金流权 企业投资 负债融资约束

领　　域： [经济管理—企业管理] [经济管理—国民经济]