作　　者： (宋献中）; ;

机构地区： 暨南大学管理学院会计学系

出　　处： 《经济与管理研究》 2010年第11期81-87,共7页

摘　　要： 本文以2006～2009年非金融类上市公司为样本,以控制权和现金流权的分离衡量控股股东和中小股东的代理成本,实证检验了控股股东和中小股东代理冲突对企业投资的影响。研究发现:控制权和现金流权的差值与企业投资显著正相关;相对于其他企业,控制权和现金流权分离的公司财务杠杆与投资的敏感系数更低,高财务杠杆对控制权和现金流权分离与投资的敏感系数无显著影响。本文认为:控股股东和中小股东的代理成本"激励"企业投资行为,而且会弱化负债的治理作用。 In this paper, we use the samples of non - financial listed firms during 2006 - 2009, take the separation of control rights and cash flow rights as the measure of agency costs between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, do the empirical analysis on the relationship between the leverage and investment in the conflict of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The results show that the investment is increased when the gap of control rights and cash flow rights is large, the investment is induced when the leverage is high, compared to other companies, the sensitivity of leverage and investment is lower when the gap is large , the leverage has no significant effect on sensitivity coefficients of the gap and investment. So we think the agency cost of the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders promotes the investment, the leverage inhibits the investment and the gap discourages the leverage＇ s effect .

关 键 词： 财务杠杆 控制权和现金流权 投资行为

领　　域： [经济管理—企业管理] [经济管理—国民经济]