作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学工商管理学院

出　　处： 《会计研究》 2023年第3期98-110,共13页

摘　　要： 上市公司参与设立投资基金是一种国内新兴的公司风险投资模式,对上市公司自身发展及创业企业成长均具有重要影响,因此具有重要研究价值。本文以2011-2019年中国A股上市公司为样本,研究了投行背景高管对公司参与设立投资基金的影响。研究发现:投行背景高管会促进公司参与设立投资基金,且投行背景高管的权力越大,促进效应越强。上述关系在公司风险承担水平较低、投融资能力较弱时更加显著。进一步地,有投行背景高管的公司更倾向于将子公司等关联方设定为投资基金管理人,投资基金中金融机构有限合伙人数量更多,且投资基金设立事件的市场反应更积极。本研究丰富了高管职业背景经济后果及公司风险投资活动影响因素的研究成果,对公司优化高管团队结构具有一定参考价值。 The participation of listed companies in the establishment of investment funds is an emerging corporate venture capital model in China,which has a significant impact on the development of listed companies and the growth of start-up enterprises,and therefore has important research value.Based on data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2019,this paper investigates how executives with investment banking backgrounds influence the decision to establish investment funds and the underlying mechanisms.The results indicate that executives with investment banking backgrounds have a promoting effect on the establishment of investment funds by listed companies,and the greater the power of executives with investment banking backgrounds,the more significant the promoting effect.The above relationship is more pronounced among companies with lower level of risk-taking and weaker investment and financing capacity.Furthermore,companies with investment banking background executives tend to designate subsidiaries and related parties as investment fund managers,with a higher number of financial institution limited partners in investment funds,and a more positive market response to investment fund establishment events.This study enriches the research results on the economic consequences of executive career background and the influencing factors of corporate venture capital activities,and has certain reference value for optimizing the structure of the executive team in companies.

关 键 词： 投资基金 投行背景 高管团队 烙印理论 高管权力

领　　域： [经济管理—金融学]