作　　者： (王贤彬）; ; (徐现祥）;

机构地区： 暨南大学经济学院

出　　处： 《中国工业经济》 2014年第7期31-43,共13页

摘　　要： 本文建立一个一般均衡模型刻画了中国地方政府出让土地、投资基础设施和主导经济增长的行为。模型发现,在政治集权和经济分权的体制下,中国地方政府官员为了追逐政治晋升收益与私人经济收益,会利用土地处置权。在垄断的土地市场上策略性地设定土地出让价格与土地出让规模,进而利用土地出让收入与相关税收收入,投资公共基础设施以推动经济增长与获取财政收入。地方政府官员的晋升动机越强、向中央发送能力信号的效率越高、提供基础设施的效率越高、受到的监管越严格、地方政府税收留存比例越高、土地原始征用价格越低,则地方政府官员倾向于出让更多的土地、提供更多的公共基础设施,实现更高的经济产出。各种经济与政治因素在影响最终产出水平的同时,也影响了地方政府税收收入、地方政府土地出让收入、居民收入以及地方政府官员私人经济收入,改变了整个经济的收入分配格局。 This paper constructs a general equilibrium model to characterize＇ how local officials lease land, invest in infrastructure and promote economic growth. To achieve career promotion and economic benefits, local officials exploit the land disposal powers, set price and lease land strategically in the monopolistic land market, and get value-added benefits, and then use the income to provide infrastructure to promote economic growth and to meet their own economic interests. The stronger of local officials promotion motivation, the higher efficiency of officials＇ ability to send signals to the central government, the higher efficiency of the provision of public infrastructure, the more stringent supervision officials subject to, the higher proportion of local government revenue retention, the lower land expropriation price, then government officials tend to lease more land and provide more public infrastructure, achieve higher levels of economic output. Various economic and political factors also profoundly influence local government tax revenues, local government land leasing revenue, resident income and local government officials＇ private income.

关 键 词： 地方政府 土地出让 基础设施投资 经济增长

领　　域： [经济管理—政治经济学]