作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东工业大学管理学院

出　　处： 《南京财经大学学报》 2022年第4期55-65,共11页

摘　　要： 以2008—2017年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验高管贫困经历、薪酬激励与真实盈余管理的关系。结果发现,高管贫困经历与真实盈余管理负相关,货币薪酬激励及股权薪酬激励对二者的关系发挥显著的调节作用。机制检验发现,高管贫困经历部分通过风险承担水平发挥对真实盈余管理的抑制作用;基于企业异质性和高管异质性视角的研究表明,高管贫困经历对真实盈余管理的抑制作用在成长期的企业、市场化程度更高的企业、有贫困经历的男性高管、有贫困经历且有海外背景的高管、有贫困经历且有学术背景的高管样本组更显著。丰富了高管贫困经历的经济后果、真实盈余管理的影响因素、薪酬激励及高阶理论等的经验研究,对提高会计信息质量、加强投资者保护、提升信息监管水平及薪酬契约设计有效性等具有一定的参考价值。 Based on the sample of China’s A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017,this paper empirically tests the relationship between executive poverty experience,compensation incentives and real earnings management.The results show that executive poverty experience is negatively related to real earnings management,and monetary compensation and equity compensation play a significant moderating role in the relationship between them.The results of mechanism test show that the experience of top managers' poverty partly inhibits the real earnings management through the level of risk-taking.Further,based on the perspective of firm heterogeneity and executive heterogeneity,the results show that the inhibitory effect of executive poverty experience on real earnings management is more significant in the sample groups of enterprises in growth stage,enterprises in higher degree of marketization,male executives with poverty experience,executives with poverty experience and overseas background,executives with poverty experience and academic background.The paper enriches empirical research on economic consequences of poverty experience,influencing factors of real earnings management,compensation incentives and the higher-order theory,and has certain reference value for improving the quality of accounting information,strengthening investor protection,enhancing the level of information supervision and the effectiveness of compensation design.

关 键 词： 高管贫困经历 货币薪酬激励 股权薪酬激励 真实盈余管理 企业生命周期

领　　域： [经济管理—企业管理] [经济管理—国民经济]