作　　者： (杨爱平）; ;

机构地区： 华南师范大学公共管理学院行政管理系

出　　处： 《社会学研究》 2012年第4期105-126,243-244,共22页

摘　　要： 本文把某些城市社区居委会有选择地采取弄虚作假、搞形式主义乃至欺骗的办法应付上级派发的各种工作压力的现象概括为选择性应付行为。通过构建街道办(政府)、居委会、居民三者间行动逻辑和策略选择的理论框架,本文尝试对居委会的选择性应付行为为何发生以及何以可能发生加以解释:一方面,居委会组织内部人力、财力、权力、时间等资源的极度短缺,造成了居委会协管能力严重不足,作为"弱者",居委会只能以应付的方式来抵触上级政府的超负荷压力。另一方面,在职责同构和压力型体制的行政环境下,上级政府尤其是街道办事处迫于向居委会寻求政绩支持的需要,默认乃至容忍了后者的选择性应付行为;而辖区居民受经济理性的影响,只关注居委会能否回应和解决居民事务的基本诉求,对于居委会的选择性应付行为采取了听之任之的冷漠态度。如此,居委会的选择性应付行为便有了重复发生的生存土壤。 In order to cope with various overloaded tasks pressurized from the higher authorities,some community residents’committees selectively use fraud,engage- ment in formalism and even deceptive ways to carry out their daily jobs,which is termed as selective pressurizing-responding phenomenon by this paper. By constructing a theoretical framework about the behavior logic and strategic choices of the government,the community residents’committee and the residents,this paper tries to explain why this phenomenon could happen and how it sustains itself in practice. On the one hand,the community residents ’ committee severely lacks manpower resources,financial resources,power and time resources,which seriously compromises their administrative capabilities,therefore,the community residents’committee has to selectively choose pressurizing-responding strategy to manipulate the overwhelming tasks assigned from the higher authorities; on the other hand,under the circumstance of isomorphic responsibility governmental system and pressure-type administrative system,in order to secure political achievements,the higher authorities especially the subdistrict administrative offices tend to tolerate the community residents’committee’s deceptive behaviors and always take a permissive attitude towards residents committee’s selective pressurizing-responding.

关 键 词： 社区居委会 选择性应付 弱者的武器 街 居 共谋 经济理性

领　　域： [政治法律—政治学] [政治法律—中外政治制度]