作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《中大管理研究》 2015年第1期1-25,共25页

摘　　要： 本文基于不完全契约理论，构建大股东与经理人的博弈模型来揭示股权结构、产品市场竞争如何影响经理人激励。模型表明股权集中度的提高也具有负面作用，即降低经理人激励；产品市场竞争越激烈，股权集中对经理人激励的边际负向作用越强。以上结论意味着股权集中对经理人激励的影响并不单调，而是呈“倒U”型曲线关系，并存在最优股权结构；产品市场竞争的加剧会使得最优股权结构趋于分散化。最后，本文利用2003～2012年的数据验证了上述结论。本文的结果有助于我们理解不同行业间企业股权结构的差异，并为企业调整股权结构提供参考。 Based on incomplete contracts theory, the author develops a theoretical model, which describes the game between large shareholders and managers, to reveal how ownership structure and product market competition affect the managerial incentives The result shows that ownership concentration can also reduce the managerial incentives, the fiercer the product market competition is, the larger the negative marginal effect of ownership concentration on managerial incentives. The above results imply that the relationship between ownership concentration and managerial incentives is of reversed U shape rather than monotone, and the optimal ownership structure exists; product market competition would lead the optimal ownership structure to a more decentralized one. In the end, the author justify the results by using the sample from 2003 to 2012. This research helps us understand the difference in ownership structure between firms coming from different industries, and give suggestions to firms on how to adjust their ownership structure

关 键 词： 股权结构 产品市场竞争 经理人激励 不完全契约

领　　域： [经济管理—企业管理] [经济管理—国民经济]