作　　者： (张志扬）; ;

机构地区： 华南师范大学政治与行政学院

出　　处： 《太原师范学院学报（社会科学版）》 2008年第6期28-30,共3页

摘　　要： 康德对"出现"和"自在之物"的二分,预设了"自在之物"的存在,但由于我们理性的局限性却又不能形成关于它的任何知识,既然如此,我们又怎能知道它的存在,也就是怎样从"此岸到达彼岸",因此,有人就批判康德说这一概念是对传统哲学中超验实体这一教条主义的让步,是与他的批判哲学精神不一致的。这样理解是错误的,其实康德意义上的自在之物并不是独立于思维的实体领域的一部分,而是一种思维工具,是我们人类思维在思考日常经验时必定要做的一种假定,只有通过它,我们才能运行我们的概念机制,在这种机制中,客观化倾向起了关键的作用。 Kant＇s distinction between ＂appearances＂ and ＂things-in-themselves＂ asserts the existence of ＂things-in-themselves＂, but due to the limitation of our rationality, we cannot form any knowledge about it, then how can we know their existence, i.e. how to get ＂other shore from this shore. ＂ Therefore, some critics holds that this concept by Kant is the concession to a dogmatically rooted extra-mental reality of a philosophy and is no in consistent to his spirit of critical philosophy. This understanding is wrong, as Kant＇ s things-in-themselves concept is not independent part from the sphere of entity in thinking, but a thinking device, and an inevitable assumption when we human beings think about daily experience. Only by this can we run our concept mechanism, in which the tendency of objectivity plays a vital role.

关 键 词： 自在之物 感性 知性 理性

领　　域： [哲学宗教—外国哲学]