作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学

出　　处： 《会计研究》 2020年第6期49-60,共12页

摘　　要： 本文考察上市公司受股价崩盘风险影响后政府通过提供政府补助发挥“扶持之手”的作用,实证研究发现:公司受股价崩盘风险的影响程度越大,其获得的政府补助越多;但相比非国有控股上市公司,国有控股上市公司获得政府补贴更为及时。进一步研究发现,与政府的关系更密切、所在地区的政商关系更亲近、在地区经济中的重要性更大的公司,其在受股价崩盘风险影响后获得的政府补助更多。受股价崩盘风险影响后,公司主要获得了以提升企业经济绩效为导向的经济发展型政府补助,并且政府补助也有助于缓解股价崩盘风险对公司借款能力的负面影响。本文丰富了股价崩盘风险经济后果的研究,对政商互动关系进行了扩展性探讨,具有一定的现实启示意义。 This study examines a channel of the government's helping hand,the government subsidies for firms exposed to stock price crash risk.Using data on China’s A-share non-financial listed companies from 2008 to 2016,we find that higher crash risk exposure induces more government subsidy.Compared with non-state-controlled companies,state-controlled companies receive government subsidies in a more timely manner.Further study finds that companies with closer relationships with the government,located in regions with a more cordial politics-business environment,and are pivotal to the regional economy,receive more government subsidies facing stock price risk exposure.The study also finds that companies mainly receive economic development-oriented government subsidies;and the government subsidy,in turn,helps to mitigate the negative impact of the stock price risk exposure on their borrowing capacity.This paper enriches the studies on the economic consequences of crash risk and expands the research on interactions between the government and the market.

关 键 词： 股价崩盘风险 政府补助 产权性质 政商关系

领　　域： [经济管理—金融学]