作 者: ;
机构地区: 中山大学管理学院
出 处: 《管理学季刊》 2021年第1期104-126,168,169,共25页
摘 要: 本文利用“中组部18号文”的外生冲击检验官员独立董事辞职对企业风险承担的影响及其作用机制。以2013~2015年发生独立董事辞职的上市公司为研究样本,采用双重差分模型进行检验,实证结果发现:①政治关联丧失后企业的风险承担水平显著上升;②在更为有效的制度环境中,政治关联丧失对企业风险承担的正向作用更强。对政治关联丧失影响企业风险承担作用机制的进一步分析表明,政治资源丧失所引起的企业战略调整,以及独立董事胜任能力变化(声誉更高、年龄更小)所导致的治理结构调整是促使企业选择更为积极的投资策略进而愿意承担更高风险的重要实现机制。 Existing literatures did not reach consensus in terms of if political connections may or may not be beneficial to corporate risk-taking.These inconsistent conclusions may be related to the fact that the previous literature is more from a static perspective of political connection,leading to complex endogeneity issues.Drawing on a dynamic perspective of political connection breakage,this paper tries to understand how an exogenous shock affects corporate risk-taking.This perspective may help us understand the economic consequences of the loss of political connections,and then reverse the internal motivation of companies to establish political connections to provide directional empirical evidence for existing disputes;it may also help us to comprehensively understand the company’s decision-making characteristics after the loss of political resources,and then objectively evaluate micro impacts on the firms.In view of the above background,this article utilizes“Rule 18”as an exogenous shock,taking the listed companies whose independent directors resign between 2013 and 2015 as our research sample,and determining whether the political connection is lost by the mandatory resign of independent directors with official identity.Our empirical analyses employ a difference-in-differences research design to examine the pre-and post-period corporate risk-taking.Based on resource dependence theory,upper echelon theory,and institutional theory,this paper proposes two main research hypotheses.First,ceteris paribus,compared with firms where non-official independent directors resign,firms with the resignation of official independent directors will have a significantly higher risk-taking level.Second,ceteris paribus,the increase in corporate risk-taking is more pronounced when firms are located in the region with a better institutional environment.We find that in the pre-and post-observation period,the risk-taking level of firms with resigned official directors is significantly higher than that of firms with resigned non-officia