作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《会计与经济研究》 2019年第1期3-22,共20页

摘　　要： 不同于独立企业,系族集团内部资本市场具有成本节约和资源共享的优势,也可以发挥风险共保作用,但复杂的股权结构也可能加剧集团的治理问题。那么,系族集团究竟是会降低还是增加股价崩盘风险呢?文章以2003—2015年A股非国有控股上市公司为研究样本,实证考察了系族集团与股价崩盘风险的关系。研究发现,相比于非系族集团企业,系族集团企业的股价崩盘风险更低;在排除内生性和基于配对样本的稳健性检验后,该结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,系族集团的关联交易更多;在监管处罚情境下,非系族集团企业的股价崩盘风险显著增加,而系族集团企业通过发挥风险共保机制,面临负面事件冲击时的股价崩盘风险没有显著变化。对风险共保实现机制的分析结果表明,在监管处罚后,系族集团通过减少商品服务交易掏空和增加资金交易支持,对受监管处罚影响的成员企业进行资源支持。 Different from independent firms,business groups benefit from transaction costs saving,resource sharing and risk coinsurance with the internal capital market. However,the business group is also at disadvantage with severe agency problem due to the intricate ownership structure. Therefore,the relationship between Xizu business group and stock price crash risk is uncertain. Based on the sample of non-state-owned holding listed firms in the A-share market during 2003-2015,this paper finds a compelling negative effect of Xizu business group on the stock price crash risk. The result is robust after solving the endogenous concern,using a PSM sample and other robustness tests. Further analysis finds that related party transactions( RPT) exist more significantly in Xizu business group. Specifically,when fraud regulation being detected,firms will suffer a higher crash risk. However,this relationship is not significant for Xizu business group due to the risk coinsurance effect. The results of coinsurance mechanism analysis show that after fraud regulation,Xizu business group will support the regulated firms by reducing goods and service transactions of RPT or increasing fund transactions of RPT.

关 键 词： 系族集团 股价崩盘风险 关联交易 风险共保

领　　域： [经济管理—金融学]