作　　者： ;

机构地区： 南京林业大学经济管理学院

出　　处： 《管理学报》 2022年第9期1409-1418,共10页

摘　　要： 从代理理论和制度设计视角考察我国上市公司实施员工持股计划对其未来股价暴跌风险的影响,并剖析其作用机理。实证结果表明,现阶段实施了员工持股计划的上市公司未来股价暴跌风险更高,支持代理假说。从制度设计视角研究发现,员工持股计划的制度设计特征驱动管理层和大股东更倾向于隐瞒坏消息,故而加重上市公司未来股价暴跌风险。此外,异质性检验显示,员工持股计划与股价暴跌风险之间的正向关系在非国有企业和内部控制质量差的公司中显著。 Based on the agency theory and policy design perspective,this study investigates the influence and mechanism of employee stock ownership plans(ESOPs)on firms’future stock price crash risk.The empirical results show that the firms’implemented ESOPs have higher future stock price crash risk,supporting the agency hypothesis.The underlying mechanisms from policy design perspective is further explained.The results show that managements and large shareholders have incentives to hold bad news due to the unique policy design characteristics of current ESOP regulations,leading to higher future stock price crash risks.Furthermore,it is found that the positive relationship between ESOPs and crash risk is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and firms with lower internal control quality.

关 键 词： 员工持股计划 股价暴跌风险 代理理论

领　　域： [经济管理—管理学]