作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学马克思主义学院

出　　处： 《重庆社会科学》 2023年第9期6-25,共20页

摘　　要： 分析师是资本市场中重要的信息中介,但目前鲜有文献讨论信息披露监管与分析师信息环境之间的关系。基于年报问询函这一监管方式的实证研究发现:公司收到年报问询函后,分析师盈余预测时所使用的公共信息和私有信息显著增加;年报问询函对分析师信息环境的作用受到信息供需关系的影响,年报问询函揭示的信息含量越多、质量越高,外部信息需求越高,则问询函对分析师信息环境的影响越显著。进一步分析发现,年报问询函能够促进分析师的实地调研,提高分析师盈余预测质量。最后,分析师信息环境有助于加强年报问询函对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用。探讨年报问询函对分析师信息环境的影响,丰富了问询函有效性的研究,具有重要的现实启示意义。 Despite the importance of analysts as information intermediaries in the capital market,there is a lack of research on the relationship between information disclosure regulations and analysts’information environment.The empirical study on the annual report comment letter finds a significant increase in the utilization of both public and private information in analyst earnings forecasts after a company receiving an annual report comment letter.This effect is contingent upon the supply and demand of information.Specifically,the comment letter has a greater impact when it reveals more and higher quality information and when there is a higher external demand for information.Furthermore,the annual report comment letter can stimulate analysts’on-site investigations and enhance the quality of earnings forecasts.Finally,analysts’information environment strengthens the inhibition effect of comment letters on stock price crash risk.This research contributes to the understanding of the effectiveness of annual report comment letters and has important practical implications for regulatory authorities and market participants.

关 键 词： 问询函 分析师信息环境 公共信息 私有信息

领　　域： [经济管理—企业管理] [经济管理—国民经济]