作　　者： ;

机构地区： 暨南大学管理学院

出　　处： 《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》 2020年第6期32-46,共15页

摘　　要： 独董薪酬对经理人薪酬契约有效性的影响存在争议。为探讨独董薪酬激励的有效性,本文将独董薪酬激励划分为激励不足和激励过度两种情况,并基于激励理论和寻租理论,引入经理人兼任薪酬委员会委员这一调节变量,考察独董薪酬激励不足和激励过度对经理人超额薪酬的影响。研究结果表明,独董薪酬激励不足会对独董形成监督激励,抑制经理人超额薪酬;独董薪酬激励过度会导致独董进行寻租,促进经理人超额薪酬;经理人兼任薪酬委员会委员将正向调节独董薪酬激励过度和经理人超额薪酬间的正向关系。进一步研究发现,独董薪酬激励不足形成的激励作用是有限的,未能显著提升企业未来业绩;独董薪酬激励过度作为寻租信号,不利于提升企业未来业绩。 The study about the effect of independent director compensation on CEO compensation contract remains controversial.In order to examine the effectiveness of independent director incentive compensation,independent director compensation is divided as undercompensation and overcompensation and we would explore their impact on excess CEO compensation based on the incentive compensation theory and rent-seeking theory as well as considering the moderation effect of whether the CEO is the member of compensation committee.The results show that undercompensated independent directors would be motivated to monitor the CEO and reduce excess CEO compensation while overcompensated independent directors would collude with CEO and increase excess CEO compensation.Besides,CEO who holds a post in compensation committee would positively moderate the relationship between independent director overcompensation and excess CEO compensation.Further,this study shows that the incentive effect of undercompensation is constrained that undercompensation would not significantly improve corporate performance while the overcompensation reflects the rent-seeking signal and has a negative effect on corporate performance.

关 键 词： 独立董事 薪酬激励 经理人超额薪酬 企业业绩 薪酬契约

领　　域： [经济管理—企业管理] [经济管理—国民经济]