作　　者： ; (邓路）; ;

机构地区： 华南理工大学工商管理学院

出　　处： 《系统工程理论与实践》 2014年第12期3091-3102,共12页

摘　　要： 基于社会网络视角研究独立董事治理功能是公司治理研究的最新发展领域.本文采用部分可观测Bivariate Probit模型,实证研究了中国上市公司独立董事网络位置对公司违规行为的影响.丰富的网络关系有助于独立董事掌握更多的社会资本,提高其监督动机和监督能力,从而有效抑制上市公司违规行为.实证检验发现,独立董事网络中心度与上市公司违规倾向呈显著负相关关系,表明独立董事网络对其监督职能的发挥存在促进作用.补充检验发现,独立董事网络的监督促进作用主要体现在制约信息披露违规方面,在非信息披露违规方面作用不明显;将独立董事区分为审计委员会成员和非审计委员会成员后,发现仅有担任审计委员会成员的独立董事的网络关系才具有显著的监督促进作用;独立董事网络的监督促进作用在盈利性较差的公司中表现更为明显.研究结果丰富了独立董事、董事网络和上市公司违规的研究成果. Researching the governance role of independent directors on the network view is an updated field of corporate governance. Using the Bivariate Probit model, this study investigates the influence of network position of independent directors on corporate violation of rules. Independent directors with rich network relationships can possess more social capital to improve their motivation and ability of monitoring, which will reduce the possibility of corporate violation of rules. Consistent with theoretical analysis, the result shows that the network centrality of independent directors has significantly negative relationship with the propensity of corporate violation of rules. The study reveals that network of independent directors has positive influence on their monitoring roles. The complementary tests show that the active effect of independent director networks exists in the aspect of information disclosure fraud, but not in the aspect of other kinds of fraud; networks of independent directors entering audit committees have active effect, but others have not; the active effect of independent director networks is more significant in firms with worse profitability. This paper complements the literature of independent directors, board networks and corporate violation of rules.

关 键 词： 独立董事 网络位置 公司违规 社会网络 公司治理

领　　域： [经济管理—会计学] [经济管理—国民经济]