作　　者： ; (林晓燕）;

机构地区： 汕头大学商学院

出　　处： 《汕头大学学报（人文社会科学版）》 2013年第5期61-67,95,共7页

摘　　要： 中小企业的发展已成为推动和保持中国经济高速增长的重要力量,但是融资困境已成为制约中小企业发展的主要因素。借贷双方信息不对称问题是造成中小企业融资难的一个重要原因。在信息不对称的情况下,信贷市场存在逆向选择的行为是一个共识,因此将信号博弈模型引入中小企业融资难的现实情景中,分析之后可得出的结论主要有:信息对称的信贷市场是有效率的;在信息不对称条件下贷款人只愿意提供一个较高的贷款利率;在信息不对称以及企业传递信号成本无差异时,逆向选择的问题不能得到解决;在信息不对称以及企业传递信号成本有差异时,可以消除信贷市场中的逆向选择问题。基于分析结果,最后提出相关的政策建议。 The development of SMEs has become a significant force driving and maintaining China's soaring economic growth. The financing predicament of SMEs, however, has become the main factor that restricts the development of these companies. The asymmetric information on both sides of debit and credit is a major cause of this predicament. It is commonsensical that adverse selection in the credit market is the result of information asymmetry of both participants. Therefore, this paper adopts signaling game model to analyze the financing predicament of SMEs, and it comes to 4 conclusions:(1)credit market is effective under the context of symmetric information;(2)under the context of asymmetric information, creditors are only willing to provide a higher lending rates;(3)with asymmetric information and indifferent signaling cost, the problem of adverse selection cannot be solved;(4)with asymmetric information and different signaling cost, the problem of adverse selection in credit market can be eliminated.

关 键 词： 中小企业 信息不对称 融资 信号博弈

领　　域： [经济管理—企业管理] [经济管理—国民经济]