作　　者： ;

机构地区： 浙江财经学院人文学院哲学与政治学系

出　　处： 《中国人民大学学报》 2005年第4期47-53,共7页

摘　　要： 在对行为当事人的“作为”或“懈怠”做道德责任评价的时候,应当既考虑到其在身体动作方面的能与否,又考虑到其在心智认识方面的能与否;既考虑到其行为的近因性因果关系控制,又考虑到其行为的远因性因果关系控制。以此观之,在当代西方分别以哈里·弗兰克福特和约翰·马丁·费舍尔等人为代表的两种道德责任归因理论中,后者虽然正确地认识和指出了前者的不足,但其对“懈怠”的道德责任负责条件的理解失之偏窄,而对“懈怠”的道德责任免责条件的理解则失之过宽。 This paper is devoted to a critical analysis of two types of moral responsibility ascription theory which are contrary to each other and have respectively been proposed by Harry Frankfurt, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza. Both of Frankfurt's theory typically represented in “Alternate Possibility and Moral Responsibility”’ and Fischer's theory typically represented in “Responsibility and Inevitability” has its own weakness at the same time with strength. Whereas Fischer's theory has reasonably pointed out the weakness of Frankfurt' theory, his views on the requirements for the “omission” to be morally responsible is some of narrow-minded and would in some circumstances be morally indulgent with omission. The key cause that leads such a weakness to Fischer's theory consists in two factors: One is that Fischer considered the ability relevant to omission only as the ability of bodily movement, the other is that he took in consideration only “the causal control as proximate cause” relevant to omission, with being neglectful of “the causal control as remote cause” which is also relevant to omission.

关 键 词： 道德责任 负责和免责条件 道德归因理论

领　　域： [哲学宗教—伦理学]