作　　者： ; (苏文兵）;

机构地区： 南京大学商学院

出　　处： 《财贸研究》 2019年第2期74-87,共14页

摘　　要： 从政治关联的保护效应出发,采用2011—2015年沪深两市A股非国有上市公司为研究样本,以企业年度涉诉次数和涉诉金额为被解释变量,考察政治关联与企业涉诉风险的关系。结论显示:(1)政治关联能降低企业涉诉风险;(2)相比官员型政治关联,代表型政治关联降低企业涉诉风险的效果更加明显;(3)政治关联对企业涉诉风险的影响受限于当地的法制完善程度,仅当法制完善程度较低时政治关联才能降低企业涉诉风险,而当法制完善程度较高时,政治关联难以发挥作用;(4)政治关联主要降低的是企业被诉的概率而不是企业起诉的概率;(5)政治关联主要降低的是企业借款融资类诉讼发生的概率而不是买卖合同类诉讼的概率。 From the perspective of protection effect of political connection, this paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for 2011 to 2015 as a sample to examine the relationship between the political connection and the lawsuit risks involved in the business. The conclusion shows political connection can reduce the risk of enterprises′ lawsuit, and the representative-type political connection has a more obvious effect on reducing the risk of litigation when compared with official-type political connection. At the same time, the influence of the political connection on the risk is limited by local legal system perfection. Only when the legal system is poor, can the political relation reduce the risk, the political relation is difficult to exert effect when the legal system is perfect enough. Further study has found that political connection mainly reduces the probability of firms being sued rather than the probability of the prosecution, and mainly reduces the probability of the occurrence of financing suits rather than the sale and purchase of contractual suits.

关 键 词： 涉诉风险 政治关联 保护效应

领　　域： [经济管理—金融学]