作　　者： ;

机构地区： 浙江大学经济学院

出　　处： 《经济研究》 2012年第8期132-145,共14页

摘　　要： 在公共品博弈中,搭便车会导致合作瓦解,这是一个著名的社会困境。大量研究表明,对搭便车进行惩罚,是维护公共合作的有效机制。但惩罚是有成本的,它又会诱发二阶搭便车,进而导致惩罚机制瓦解,这种情形被称为二阶社会困境。如何化解这一困境,是该研究领域最具挑战性的问题之一。通过一个多行为主体(Multi-Agent)演化博弈随机过程的计算机仿真即可证明,在不改变其他假设的情况下,只要公共品的回报足够大,惩罚行为就能保持稳定的演化趋势。研究显示,随着公共品回报的不断增加,二阶搭便车对惩罚者的演化优势会不断缩小;当这种优势足够小时,它就可能被演化过程的随机性所抵消。本文的跨学科研究表明,以公平和公正为宗旨的社会正义是化解社会困境的必要前提;在人类的公共合作中,正义原则优先于效率原则;而人类天性中的正义感,则是这一社会规范内部化的产物。 In a public goods game, due to the existence of free-riders, the public cooperation faces a collapse. This is called the social dilemma. Researches show that punishing defection is an effective way of resolving this problem. However, punishment is costly, leading to the appearance of second-order free-riders, which prevents punishing behavior from evolving. This situation gives rise to the second-order social dilemma. How does costly punishment arise and evolve？ This has become a widely discussed issue in evolutionary research. A computer simulation was conducted, we found that the punishers will obtain evolutionary advantage if the returns of the public goods are large enough. The dominance of cooperators against punishers diminishes as the returns increases, when such dominance becomes sufficiently weak, it is very likely to be offset by the randomness in the evolutionary dynamics. The research shows that, in public cooperation, social justice is the necessary premise and justice principle is prior to efficiency principle, the natural selection endowed mankind with the sense of justice.

关 键 词： 公共品博弈 社会困境 利他惩罚 二阶社会困境 社会正义

领　　域： [经济管理—政治经济学]