作　　者： ; (邵毅平）;

机构地区： 浙江财经大学会计学院

出　　处： 《南京审计大学学报》 2017年第2期20-28,共9页

摘　　要： 以国有上市公司为研究样本,采用专利申请量作为衡量企业创新的指标,检验管理者和普通员工之间的薪酬差距对企业创新的影响,以及高管的政府任职经历是否会影响薪酬差距与企业创新之间的关系。检验结果表明,内部薪酬差距相对合理的企业显著开展了更多的创新活动,说明合理的薪酬差距对企业创新具有促进作用,但薪酬差距的创新促进效应在管理者有政府任职经历的国有企业中显著更小。同时,管理层权力不会弱化薪酬差距对国有企业创新的促进作用,这表明薪酬差距对国有企业管理者具有重要的激励效应,但有政府任职经历的管理者面临的潜在行政级别晋升激励减弱了薪酬差距的激励作用,从而为国企高管薪酬契约的分类管理提供了重要的实证证据。 With the state-owned listed companies as research samples and the amount of patent application as an index to measure enterprise innovation,this paper examines the effect of pay gap between executives and employees on the innovation of state-owned enterprises and whether the government＇s office experience of executives affects the relationship between pay gap and enterprise innovation..The test results show that the internal pay gap is conducive to carrying out a significant number of innovative activities for relatively reasonable enterprises,which reflects that a reasonable salary gap can promote enterprise innovation.But the innovation effect of the pay gap is significantly smaller in state-owned enterprises in which executives have government service experience.Further tests show that the managerial power doesn＇t weaken the incentive effect of pay gap on innovation of state-owned enterprise,which shows that the pay gap has an important incentive effect on management.However,the incentives of potential administrative promotion faced by the management with government service experience have weakened the incentive effect of the pay gap,thus providing important empirical evidence for the classification management of executive compensation contract.

关 键 词： 薪酬差距 高管的政府任职经历 国有企业创新 公司治理 薪酬操纵 限薪令 有效契约观

领　　域： [经济管理—企业管理] [经济管理—国民经济]