作 者: ;
机构地区: 浙江财经学院会计学院
出 处: 《财会通讯(学术版)》 2006年第10期43-45,52,共4页
摘 要: 审计独立性与审计质量始终是审计研究领域的核心问题。本文以纵横国际为例,采用博弈论的方法,从审计师与公司管理者的较量角度审视审计独立性与审计质量的关系。我们认为:制度对审计独立性和审计质量的影响并不是直接的,而是通过影响审计师在与客户管理当局的博弈中的决策行为而对审计独立性发挥作用,然后带来审计质量的变化。 Auditor independence and audit quality is the core problem of audit area. Take Tonmac International as example ,the framework is particularly concerned with the application of the Game Theory to analyze the relationship of auditor independence and audit quality from the aspect of the conflicts between auditors and corporation managers. We consider that the impact of Institutional Arrangements on independence and audit quality is not direct,it make auditor independence working by its infulunces on auditors'deciding action in their games with corporation managers.
领 域: [经济管理—会计学] [经济管理—国民经济]