作　　者： (李永刚）; ;

机构地区： 南京大学政府管理学院

出　　处： 《江苏行政学院学报》 2011年第2期73-78,共6页

摘　　要： 经济学家将中国特色的地方官员强激励模式命名为"政治锦标赛",强调各地基于发展速度的相对绩效排名,在很大程度上决定了主政官员的晋升。但经验研究表明,单一的竞速晋升模型在学理层面解释力不足,在实践层面弊端明显。"双轨制"的技巧类竞赛模型可能更加适合中国当前的制度环境。只要对现有的绩效考核指标体系进行适度调整,就可以将竞速类锦标赛变为竞技类锦标赛,从而推动政府治理从"为GDP而竞争"向"为和谐而竞争"转型。 Economists termed the competition of local officials, who are under high-powered incentives, as ＂political promotion tournament model＂. It emphasizes that the relative performance position in development speed determines largely the promotion of chief officials. However, the empirical experience shows that the single promotion model is not solid and shows shortcomings in practice. This skill-oriented tournament model fits China＇s institutional environment better. By making moderate adjustments on the performance evaluation system, the central government can change velocity-oriented tournament into skill-oriented tournament, thus motivating government administration from competing for GDP to competing for harmony.

关 键 词： 地方官员 政治锦标赛 晋升 激励制度

领　　域： [政治法律—政治学] [政治法律—中外政治制度]