作 者: ;
机构地区: 广州城市职业学院
出 处: 《逻辑学研究》 2019年第4期90-101,共12页
摘 要: 《荀子》的“类”观念之所指,按形式可分为个体型对象“类”和关系型对象“类”;按性质则可分为感性“类”和价值性“类”。《荀子》的个体型对象“类”,包括感性个体“类”和价值性个体“类”,其中体现的是儒家在实践领域应然的“宜”、“义”即善、义务、正当等“应然”特点,而非认知意义上的客观性或事实性,不是以对象的共同固有客观属性为根据的“类”,其感性与价值性不分,统一于价值性。由于从价值而非固有性质来认识和规定对象,《荀子》的个体型对象“类”,其根本性质不是认知性而是价值性的。 Lei (类) in Xunzi, can be differentiated as lei of individual object and that of relationshiptype of object according to its form;or, lei of perceptual knowledge and that of valueimplication, according to its quality. Furthermore, lei of individual object, including thatof perceptual individual object and that of individual object of value implication, givesexpressions to Confucianist practical should-be notions of yi (宜) and yi (义), namely,goodness, obligation, righteousness, etc., without any cognitive sense of objectivity orfactuality;therefore, it can’t be viewed as a category based on the common inherent propertiesof the objects while it makes no essential difference between perceptual knowledgeand value idea with the only concern for the latter. In a word, lei of individual object inXunzi, by its very nature, is not of cognition, but of value, on account of that it definesthe objects by Confucianist values not by their inherent properties.
领 域: [哲学宗教—逻辑学]