作　　者： ; ; (蔡祺）;

机构地区： 广东财经大学会计学院

出　　处： 《财政研究》 2017年第3期56-70,共15页

摘　　要： 经济责任审计是我国自发性制度创新,理论研究具有原创价值。财政资金配置效率的提高客观上有益于我国经济社会转型发展,但在实践中通常受制于各级政府"一把手"的执政理念;经济责任审计执行则对领导干部的执政理念产生直接影响。因此,本文基于2003-2010年财政审计统计数据考察经济责任审计执行力度对财政资金配置效率的影响,首次试图就经济责任审计制度溢出效应问题展开实证研究。研究发现,经济责任审计执行力度越大,下一年财政支出配置效率越高,即便控制各种可能的影响变量,该结论依然稳健,证实了经济责任审计制度的溢出效应;2005年经济责任审计范围扩大后,"溢出效应"更为突出。本文的研究为我国独创的经济责任审计制度提供了初步的经验证据,并为财政资源配置效率的提升指出了一个可能的路径。 Theoretical research on accountability audit has original value because it is a spontaneous institutional innovation. Allocative efficiency of fiscal funds could benefit our social development, however, in practice, the allocative efficiency is largely constrained by the rulers＇ governing philosophy and accountability audit works will directly affect the ruling idea of leading cadres. In this paper, we use annual fiscal and auditing data from 2003 to 2010 of 31 Chinese provinces, to develop our empirical study on the institutional spillover effects of accountability audit for the first time. We found that ceteris paribus, the larger enforcement of accountability audit last year, the higher allocative efficiency of fiscal spending next year, which confirmed the spillover effect of accountability audit. Since the scope of accountability audit expands to the mayors＇ level in 2005, spillover effect of accountability audit has become more prominent. Our study provided a preliminary empirical evidence for the institution of accountability audit and a possible path to improve allocative efficiency of public expenditures.

关 键 词： 经济责任审计 财政资金配置效率 核算 面板模型 制度溢出效应

领　　域： [经济管理—会计学] [经济管理—国民经济]