作　　者： ;

机构地区： 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处： 《审计与经济研究》 2021年第2期85-94,共10页

摘　　要： 以2007—2017年完成重大资产重组且签订了业绩补偿承诺协议的A股上市公司为研究样本,以业绩补偿承诺是否到期为信号,研究信号影响管理者计提商誉减值的会计选择的作用。研究发现,在业绩补偿承诺期间管理者计提商誉减值的概率和金额均显著高于业绩补偿承诺到期之后,说明信号对管理者计提商誉减值的会计选择具有正向作用。进一步检验信号影响管理者计提商誉减值的作用机制后发现,具有外部可验证性的信号能够约束管理者的机会主义行为,从而影响管理者计提商誉减值的会计选择。 This paper takes A-share listed companies in China that completed major asset restructuring from 2007 to 2017 and signed performance compensation commitment agreements as research samples.Using the performance compensation commitment period as a signal to study the signal effect of performance compensation commitment on managers accounting choice.The study finds that the probability and amount of disclosing goodwill impairment during the performance compensation commitment period is significantly higher than that after it expires,indicating that the signal of performance compensation commitment has a positive effect on managers accounting choice.Further,this study examines the mechanism of signal effect of performance compensation commitment on goodwill impairment and finds that signal with external verifiability can constrain managers opportunistic behavior,thus influencing the managers accounting choice in terms of the accrual of goodwill impairment.

关 键 词： 业绩补偿承诺 信号 外部可验证性 商誉减值 会计选择 产权性质 公司治理 股权集中度

领　　域： [经济管理—企业管理] [经济管理—国民经济]