作　　者： ;

机构地区： 福州大学管理学院会计系

出　　处： 《中国注册会计师》 2004年第5期58-60,共3页

摘　　要： 本文通过构建不完美信息下公司管理层与注册会计师的动态博弈模型,分析了虚假财务报告的成因,提出:在公司管理层有机会对虚假财务报告进行改正的情况下,注册会计师的作用其实相当有限;注册会计师的行动不能抑制公司管理层的造假动机,充其量只能减少财务报告中的虚假成分。 Through constructing a dynamic game model withincomplete information for the management and certi-fied public accountants, the author analyzes the causesleading to falsified financial reports and concludes thatthe role and effectiveness of certified public accoun-tants are in fact very limited where the management hasthe chance to rectify the falsified financial reports. Theactions of the certified public accountants cannot refrainthe management from its motives to cheat, but at most,it could only reduce the degree of falsification in thefinancial reports. In the meantime, from the point of viewof changing the payment of the two parties of the game,the article also provides recommendations for the re-building of trust in financial reports.

关 键 词： 独立审计报告 动态博弈模型 信任关系 注册会计师 信任机制 管理层 企业

领　　域： [经济管理—会计学] [经济管理—国民经济]