作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中共广东省委党校

出　　处： 《城市问题》 2020年第4期97-103,共7页

摘　　要： 利用2016年中国劳动力动态调查数据,结合对数偶值模型进行实证研究,发现产权能够激发城市社区业主的居委会选举投票热情,但当产权带来负向成本压力时则会减弱其投票热情。进一步分析社区环境对住房产权影响社区选举投票的调节效应,发现劣质邻里在某种程度上促进而不是阻碍业主的投票热情,从而支持了桑德斯"对威胁的反应"理论,即劣质邻里通过对房产价值的负向影响促使业主意识到自身与社区的利益共同体关系,从而更积极地参与社区变革。 Empirical research based on 2016 China Labor Force Dynamics Survey data and using Binary Logit Model,it finds that property rights can stimulate homeowner voting enthusiasm but weaken homeowner voting enthusiasm when property rights bring negative cost pressure.Further analysis of the regulatory effect of the community environment on housing property rights affecting election voting find that poor neighborhood,to some extent,promote rather than hinder homeowners voting enthusiasm,thus supporting"response to the threat"that proposed by Saunders.Poor neighborhood becomes more actively involved in community change by making homeowners aware of their common interests through threats to property values.

关 键 词： 居委会选举投票 产权 社区环境 利益共同体

领　　域： [政治法律—政治学] [政治法律—中外政治制度] [经济管理—国民经济]