作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中山大学岭南学院

出　　处： 《商业研究》 2003年第10期131-133,共3页

摘　　要： 用一个简单的信息经济学模型 ,来表明学历在劳动力市场上的信号示意作用。如果在本科的学历下 ,能力低的工人和能力高的工人混同在一起 ,得到相同的报酬。为了区分自己 ,能力高的工人通过考研 ,留学等提高自己的学历 ,向雇主传递更强的信号 ,从而获得更高的回报。 The paper emphasizes the signaling effect of education degree in labour market through a simple model of information economics. With a bachelor degree, the employees with higher ability mix with the employees with lower ability and get the same salary. In order to distinguish themselves, the ones with higher ability decide to increase their education degree through taking graduate student examination or continuing further study abroad, so they could be known better by their employers and get higher salary.

关 键 词： 学历 劳动力市场 留学 考研 信息经济学 解释

领　　域： [经济管理—政治经济学]