作　　者： ; (李怡娜）;

机构地区： 华南理工大学工商管理学院

出　　处： 《管理工程学报》 2007年第3期39-43,共5页

摘　　要： 论证了传统供应链回购契约机制的不合理性,提出采用Stackelberg模型与Nash协商模型来设计回购契约。数据比较分析表明,利用Stackelberg模型设计回购契约可使零售商和供应商的收益得到一定改进,但没有达到供应链整体收益最优。然而利用Nash协商模型设计的回购契约机制既可使供应链收益达到最优,又可使零售商与供应商的收益得到很大的改善。因此,本文认为利用Nash协商模型得到的回购契约机制更为合理。 The article demonstrates the non-reasonability of buy-back contract mechanism of traditional supply chain, puts forward to adopt Staekelberg model and Nash negotiation model to design buy-back contract. The data comparing and analysis shows that although using Staekelberg model to design buy-back contract can improve the benefit of retailers and suppliers, it can＇t get optimal benefit of the whole supply chain. If using Nash negotiation model to design buy-back contract mechanism, we can not only get optimal benefit of the whole supply chain, but also improve the benefit of retailers and suppliers greatly. So the article takes the opinion that the buy-back contract mechanism based on Nash negotiation model will be more reasonable.

关 键 词： 供应链 回购契约机制 模型 协商模型

领　　域： [经济管理—企业管理] [经济管理—国民经济]