作　　者： (曹宗宏）; (赵菊）; (张成堂）; (闵杰）; ;

机构地区： 安徽农业大学理学院应用数学系

出　　处： 《系统工程学报》 2015年第1期104-114,共11页

摘　　要： 在单制造商通过单零售商销售品牌产品的供应链中,建立制造商有权开通直销渠道与零售渠道竞争、零售商有权提供自有产品与品牌产品竞争的供应链竞争模型.在双方进行Nash定价博弈的框架下,研究了开通直销渠道和提供自有产品的条件、双方的定价策略和供应链的均衡结构问题.结果表明:当直销渠道的操作成本和自有产品的单位成本较低时,双方的竞争可以降低因双方独立决策而引起的"双边际效应"的负面影响,实现"双赢".制造商应提高顾客对直销渠道忠诚度,零售商应提高顾客对自有产品忠诚度,同时缩小两种产品之间的差异性. Considering a manufacturer selling its national-brand （NB） product to customers through a retail channel, the paper studies the impact of competition on channel structure, pricing policy and its related profits engendered in a Nash pricing game framework under the assumption that the manufacture has the option of exploiting the direct channel to compete with the retail channel, whereas the retailer has the option of introducing a store-brand （SB） product to compete with a NB product. Results show that the competition between the manufacturer and the retailer may decrease retail prices, weaken the negative effects of double marginalization, and achieve a win-win outcome when the operating cost of the direct channel and the unit cost of the SB product are low. The manufacture should build up direct channel loyalty, but the retailer should build up SB product loyalty and reduce the SB product＇s difference with the NB product.

关 键 词： 供应链管理 直销渠道 自有产品 博弈

领　　域： [理学—运筹学与控制论] [理学—数学]