作　　者： (曾伟）; ;

机构地区： 合肥工业大学理学院

出　　处： 《合肥工业大学学报（自然科学版）》 2006年第12期1630-1634,共5页

摘　　要： 主要研究由一个制造商和一个销售商组成的二级供应链系统,面对随机价格灵敏需求且双方拥有不对称信息时,在制造商Stackelberg策略下,如何通过数量折扣手段来促成供应链协调定价的问题。数据结果表明:该策略能使制造商、销售商及供应链利润得到提高,促进链利润率的增加,减少风险降低成本,可使制造商获得更大的利润;价格高度敏感的市场对制造商有利,而对销售商及整个链不利。 This paper considers a two-level supply system composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Here studied is the problem that how the manufacturer makes pricing coordination under manufacturer Stackelberg gamte structure when facing a stochastic price-sensitive demand and asymmetric information. Numerical results show that the pricing policy can improve the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer and the supply chain, that reducing risk and decreasing costs can make the manufacturer get more profits, and that the more sensitive to price the market is, the more benefits the manufacturer gets but the less benefits the retailer and the whole chain get.

关 键 词： 供应链 数量折扣 协调定价 随机需求

领　　域： [理学—运筹学与控制论] [理学—数学]