作　　者： (李昌文）; ; ; (肖旦）;

机构地区： 华南理工大学工商管理学院

出　　处： 《系统管理学报》 2018年第4期791-792,792+794-800,共10页

摘　　要： 针对下游存在数量竞争的3个零售商的两层分销供应链系统,利用两阶段博弈的方法结合合作博弈理论中短视稳定性概念与远视稳定性概念,研究了相应的零售商联盟定货策略以及联盟稳定性问题。第1阶段,零售商自由形成联盟订购数量相同的产品;第2阶段,根据供应商和零售商之间不同的市场地位,在3种不同的博弈框架下考虑供应商与零售商间的博弈。结果表明,在Stackelberg模型中,无论谁是领导者,大联盟都不是短视稳定的,然而却是远视稳定的。对于不同的竞争强度,还给出了远视情形下可能存在的其他的稳定联盟结构。 In view of the two-level decentralized supply chain comprising one supplier and three competitive retailers, the alliance/coalition formation between retailers using a two-stage approach and coalitions stability is analyzed using the concept of shortsighted stability and farsighted stability in the cooperative game theory. In Stage 1, retailers form coalitions freely and order the same number of products. In Stage 2, based on different market positions between suppliers and retailers, the game between the supplier and the retailer is considered under three different modes of competition. The results show that, whoever the leader is, the grand coalition is not a stable structure for shortsighted retailers but a stable structure for farsighted retailers in the Stackelberg model. For different competition intensity, other stable alliance structures that may exist in farsightedness are also presented.

关 键 词： 分销供应链 合作博弈 稳定性 短视 远视

领　　域： [经济管理—企业管理] [经济管理—国民经济]