作　　者： (李琳）; (霍佳震）; ;

机构地区： 同济大学经济与管理学院

出　　处： 《系统仿真学报》 2009年第9期2757-2763,共7页

摘　　要： 在价格敏感的市场需求下,研究了一对多的两级供应链的单一产品定价及订货协调模型。卖方作为博弈主方提出批发售价、价格折扣及共同补给期策略,而作为从方的买方以最优的零售价和订货策略响应。该协调模型在Stackelberg博弈的框架下,运用遗传算法讨论了Stackelberg均衡解。并利用数值试验方法通过仿真研究分析了该协调策略的有效性和可行性。 Thepricing and order coordination for a two-echelon supply chain was studied where one vendor supplies a single product to multiple buyers, who are located in separate markets with the price-sensitive demand. The problem was analyzed under the Stackelberg game structure in which the vendor is the ＂leader＂ offering a wholesale priee, discount and a common-replenishment-epochs schedule and the buyers are the ＂followers＂ responding with the pricing and order policy. A genetic algorithm approach was proposed for finding the Stackelberg equilibrium solution to the problem. The solution procedures were designed and illustrated with numerical examples.

关 键 词： 价格敏感需求 博弈 协调 价格折扣 共同补给期 遗传算法

领　　域： [经济管理—国民经济] [理学—运筹学与控制论] [理学—数学]