作　　者： (闵杰）; ;

机构地区： 合肥工业大学管理学院

出　　处： 《复旦学报（自然科学版）》 2007年第4期523-531,共9页

摘　　要： 针对单一制造商和单一销售商组成的两层供应链系统,研究了需求受库存水平影响的供应链协调问题.首先根据制造商主导的Stackelberg对策结构(即制造商向销售商宣布价格,销售商跟着确定相应的订货量),对供应链成员间的决策问题进行了分析;然后为制造商提出了一个改善整个渠道效率的量折扣策略,研究结果表明该折扣模型不仅能提高制造商的利润,而且能改善销售商的利润,同时使供应链达到了完美协调.最后给出了应用实例,并对模型的参数进行了灵敏度分析. A supply chain coordination problem with a stock-dependent demand is considered,where the supply chain is composed of a single manufacturer with a single retailer.First,the problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer declares its wholesale price to the retailer and then the retailer follows by selecting its order quantity.Then a quantity discount pricing policy is proposed for the manufacturer that could make channel efficiency better,and the results verify that this policy can not o...

关 键 词： 库存影响需求 量折扣 供应链协调

领　　域： [经济管理—国民经济]