机构地区: 合肥工业大学管理学院
出 处: 《系统工程学报》 2018年第2期242-257,共16页
摘 要: 为研究品牌制造商NB产品感知质量的提升策略,即选择是否披露NB产品增值功能以及披露格式,建立了零售商只销售NB产品与同时销售NB和SB产品两种情形下的三阶段博弈模型.通过逆向递推法求解两情形下的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,研究发现,零售商引入SB产品会改变制造商感知质量提升策略的选择,并降低制造商的利润,但制造商通过提升NB产品感知质量可以降低零售商自有产品引入对其造成的利润损失. To investigate the national brand manufacturer's option of perceived quality promotion strategies, i.e. whether and how he should disclose the extra feature of an NB product. Two three-stage game models for two scenarios, where the retailer sells only the NB or both the NB and the SB, are developed. Solving the dynamic games by backward induction can obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Numerical studies show that the introduction of SB may change the manufacturer's promotion strategies and can decrease the manufacturer's profit; however, the manufacturer's loss due to the introduction of SB can be mitigated by promoting the NB's perceived quality.
领 域: [理学—运筹学与控制论] [理学—数学]