作　　者： ;

机构地区： 暨南大学

出　　处： 《经济学》 2009年第1期 679-692,共14页

摘　　要： 犯罪团伙成员在被捕后接受审讯时，会由于承受不住压力而表现出招供的冲动。本文以行为法经济学“短视”认知偏差模型对这种冲动的形成机制进行模拟，同时还将证明，犯罪团伙在新成员加入时要求的“投名状”是防止成员日后招供和自首的锁定措施；政府当局实施的污点证人制度则是一种鼓励招供和自首的反锁定设计。以模型的技术结构和结论为基础，本文还对一些富有中国特色的团伙犯罪刑罚实践进行了评析，并就刑罚优化设计进行了讨论。 When mobsters are on trial, they have the impulse to confess due to their failure to resist police pressures. This paper, based on the cognition bias model of myopia within the framework of behavioral law and economics, studies the mechanism of this impulse. It shows that the requirement of a toumingzhuang by gang groups for new members is a locking measure that prevents members from making confession. The system of stain witnesses, on the other hand, is a counter device that encourages mobsters to surrender to the police. Based on the theoretical model, this paper also compares stain witnesses and torture. In addition, it probes into the question of optimal penalty.

关 键 词： 短视 锁定 投名状 污点证人 刑罚设计 行为法 经济学

分 类 号： [F069.9 D924.392]

领　　域： [] []