作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东农工商职业技术学院

出　　处： 《中国管理科学》 2019年第3期53-65,共13页

摘　　要： 在贷款保证保险及农产品产出不确定性下,考虑农户受资金约束及政府补贴贷款利息,针对订单农业供应链融资中的农户存在破产风险情形,研究了政府、银行、公司及农户之间的四阶段动态博弈问题;并在分析政府补贴对供应链最优决策及各方利益的影响后,得到了社会福利最大化下的政府补贴机制。研究发现,(1)若丰收年的投入产出率超过灾害年的投入产出率2倍,政府应提供补贴机制。(2)政府补贴机制应为:①当价格敏感系数小于一定值时,政府不应提供补贴。②当价格敏感系数适中时,政府应提供部分补贴。③当价格敏感系数大于一定值时,政府应提供全额补贴。④特别地,当灾害年与丰收年的投入产出率比值提升到一定值时,政府始终应提供补贴,甚至当投入产出率比值提升到更大值时,政府应提供全额补贴。最后对'政银保'合作贷款新模式提出改进建议。 Building a new socialist countryside is to achieve agricultural modernization,and contract-farming is an important helper to promote agricultural modernization.However,with the gradual development of contract-farming in China,the plight of supply chain financing becomes increasingly prominent because of the high risk of supply chain financing and high cost of financing,and seriously restricts the process of agricultural modernization.Numerous theories are proposed to explain supply chain financing,mainly aimed at the traditional manufacturing supply chain.Due to the unique characteristics of the agriculture,such as the random yield,production easily affected by natural disasters,lacking of effective collateral,the contract-farming supply chain is different from the traditional manufacturing supply chain.Therefore,the optimal decision in the traditional manufacturing supply chain is not necessarily applicable to the contract-farming supply chain.In recent years,some scholars have considered the supply chain finance in the optimal decision-making of contract-farming supply chain.Surprisingly,most literature in agricultural supply chain financing neglected the effect of government subsidy on the optimal decision of contract-farming supply chain.In view of this,on the basis of previous research results,a two-echelon contract-farming supply chain comprised of a company and a farmer with capital constraints is studied in this paper.Considering loan guarantee insurance and the uncertainty of the production yield in the contract-farming supply chain financing,the four stage dynamic game between government,bank,company and farmer is stadied under the government subsidies for the loan interest,and the effects of government subsidy on the optimal decisions and benefits of the supply chain partners are analyzed.Furthermore,the government’s optimal subsidy mechanism,which is to maximize social welfare,is obtained.It is found that,(1)when the output rate in the harvest year is less than 2 times the output rate in the disaste

关 键 词： 保证保险 政府补贴机制 产出不确定性 资金约束 供应链融资

分 类 号： [F842.682;F323.7]

领　　域： []