作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东财经大学会计学院

出　　处： 《广东财经大学学报》 2020年第2期68-81,共14页

摘　　要： 以2012-2016年A股上市公司签订了对赌协议的定增并购事件为研究样本,分析定增并购中对赌协议与高管交易行为之间的联系,并考察高管交易行为对发行后市场绩效和财务绩效的影响。研究发现,标的公司承诺的年均净利润越高,高管越不倾向于减持、减持比例越小。但是,当以定增折价、资产评估机构声誉和标的公司年龄衡量收购方与标的公司之间的信息不对称问题时,发现仅在信息不对称问题较为缓和的情况下,承诺净利润才能对高管减持起到削弱作用;高管持股比例变动的方向不会显著影响发行后的绩效,只有当高管大量减持时,市场绩效、财务绩效才会显著下滑。研究结果验证了对赌协议的有限激励作用,揭示了发行后绩效的影响因素是高管持股比例变动的程度而非方向,为投资者解读业绩承诺与高管交易行为提供了一定的决策参考,有助于监管机构进一步规范内部人交易行为。 Taking samples of A-share listed companies which implemented M&A with private placement including value adjustment mechanism(VAM) from 2012 to 2016,this paper analyzes the relationship between VAM and managers’ stock trading in M&A with private placement,as well as the impact of managers’ stock trading on post-issue market performance and financial performance. The results suggest that the higher the annual net profit committed by the target company,the less likely the managers are to reduce their holdings stocks. However,when the information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target company is measured by the private placement discount,the reputation of the asset appraisal institution and the age of the target company,it is found that only when the information asymmetry is low,the committed profit can weaken the managers’ stock selling. The direction of managers’ stock trading will not significantly affect the post-issue performance,but when the managers sell a large number of stocks,the market performance and financial performance will show a significant decline. These results verify the limited incentive effect of the VAM,and reveal that the factor for the post-issue performance is the degree rather than the direction of the managers’ stock trading,which provides reference for investors to interpret VAM and managers’ stock trading,and help regulators to further improve the supervision system of insider trading.

关 键 词： 定增并购 对赌协议 高管减持 市场绩效 财务绩效 业绩承诺

领　　域： []