作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 不详

出　　处： 《西部金融》 2019年第5期83-88,共6页

摘　　要： 中央银行实行财务独立,能够有效避免政府通过财务预算控制权过多干预中央银行的货币政策,从而能够更好地发挥货币政策在宏观调控中的积极作用。本文在对中央银行预算独立性进行界定的基础上,通过借鉴中央银行独立性测度方法,构建了适合我国国情的中央银行预算独立性测度指标体系,对我国中央银行预算独立性进行了测度,并对预算独立性指数与我国中央银行履职绩效的关系进行了实证检验。基于研究结论,文章提出了加快推动人民银行财务预算制度变革,全面加强资产负债和业务收支管理等增强我国央行预算独立性的建议。 The financial independence of the central bank can effectively avoid the excessive interference of the government in the central bank's monetary policy through the control of the financial budget, so as to better play the positive role of monetary policy in macro-control. On the basis of defining the budget independence of the central bank, this paper constructs a measurement index system of the budget independence of the central bank, which is suitable for China's national conditions, measures the budget independence of the People's Bank of China, and makes an empirical test on the relationship between the budget independence index and the performance of the central bank of China. Based on the research conclusion, the paper finally puts forward some suggestions to accelerate the reform of the People's Bank of China's financial budget system and comprehensively strengthen the management of assets, liabilities and business revenue and expenditure in order to enhance the budget independence of the people's bank of China.

关 键 词： 中央银行 预算独立性 测度指标体系

领　　域： []