作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东财经大学

出　　处： 《广东商学院学报》 2012年第5期91-97,共7页

摘　　要： 研究生知识产权的流失既有制度原因也有经济原因。构建研究生知识产权监管的博弈模型,分析影响博弈模型纳什均衡的因素,指出研究生知识产权增值的不确定性使研究生知识产权界定具有渐进性,研究生知识产权的均衡状态是暂时的,因此,研究生有流失知识产权的激励和动机,高校必须加强监管。 The identification of postgraduate intelleetual properly rights is not complete, which exists inmany public domains. The paper establishes a game model for the supervision of graduate intellectual property rights, makes an analysis of the significance of Nash equilibrium in this model, and points out thai the certainty of the future value of postgraduate intellectual property rights makes the identification of property rights become progressive and the equilibrium condition of postgraduate intellectual properly righls becometemporary. Therefore, graduate students have the incentive and motivation of the loss of postgradute intel-lectual property rights, indieating thai the university must strengthen its related supervision.

关 键 词： 研究生知识产权 公共领域 法经济学

分 类 号： [DF0-059 DF523]

领　　域： [] []