作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中山大学

出　　处： 《深圳大学学报：人文社会科学版》 2016年第4期52-56,63共6页

摘　　要： 既然他者是外在于修辞与语言的,那么在没有将他者纳入存在话语的前提下,列维纳斯如何能够提出绝对他者的伦理概念呢？在诸多质疑者看来,这是列维纳斯无法解决的“悖谬”。对此,利奥塔认为,这只是新黑格尔式的“误读”。利奥塔确立了一种独特的规范性陈述逻辑,它不是与外延性（描述性）陈述相对称的,而是一种“外在于”或“别于”外延性（描述性）的陈述。若将列维纳斯的话语置于外延性陈述逻辑当中,定会走向形式逻辑的悖谬,最终只能产生“误读”。相反,只有将之置于一种“别于”外延性的陈述逻辑当中才能正确理解。据此,利奥塔认为,列维纳斯只是试图通过这种独特的陈述方式来暗示一种与“他者”的不对称关系,进而确立对他者的绝对责任。 Since the other was beyond rhetoric and language, how could Levinas put forward the ethical concept of the absolute other without incorporating the other into the existential discourse？ Therefore, in the opinion of many skeptics, this was ＂the paradox＂ that Levinas could not resolve. At this point, Lyotard believed that this was just a neo-Hegelian misreading. Lyotard established a unique logic of prescriptive statements, which were not commensurable with denotative （or descriptive） one, but ＂other than＂ or ＂beyond＂ it. It would go to the paradox of formal logic or misreading if the discourse of Levinas put into the logic of denotative statements. Instead, it is only being placed in a logic that ＂other than＂ denotative statements that it could be correctly understood. Accordingly, Lyotard believed that Levinas just tried to suggest an asymmetric relationship with ＂the other＂ through this unique way of statements, and then established the absolute obligation to others.

关 键 词： 利奥塔 列维纳斯 他者 悖谬 规范性陈述 绝对责任

分 类 号： [B0]

领　　域： []