作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中山大学

出　　处： 《哲学研究》 2007年第9期 67-73,共7页

摘　　要： 克里普克与弗雷格各自提出了不同的指称理论，而这两种理论都直接或间接地导源于内涵语境内的共指称替换问题。替换原则（Principle of Substitutivity）说的是，用指称相同的词项替换句子中的指称词项后句子的真值不变。这个原则令人信服地揭示了指称与真值之间的联系。但信念语境与模态语境内的指称似乎违背了这个原则，例如等同式“启明星=长庚星”和“启明星=启明星”在认知意义上可以不同。 Though it is intuitively plausible, Kripke’s theory of proper name and modality can not deal with the problem of cognitive significance of identity and the problem of reference within belief context, whereas the predication theory can do. This paper tries to ague that Kripke fails to blame the problem of reference within belief context on the nature of belief, so it is his account of reference that needs reconstruction. For the theory of Searle’s predication, the knowledge which is necessary to fix reference is none but contextual knowledge. By focusing on the relationship between reference and context, and on the basis of concept of behavior of reference and statements, the paper lays the foundation for a unified theory of reference.

关 键 词： 指称理论 语境 克里普克 认知意义 弗雷格 明星 境内 真值

分 类 号： [B081]

领　　域： []