作　　者： ;

机构地区： 电子科技大学中山学院

出　　处： 《山西财经大学学报》 2009年第2期7-12,共6页

摘　　要： 以供应链的运作模型和基本假设为出发点，分析了供应链中的交易过程，比较了零售商在显示市场需求信号与不显示市场需求信号条件下供应链中交易双方的利润，说明了供应商在实现信息共享后将获取更大的利润，提出了在供应链中激励零售商共享需求信息的必要条件，即通过对供应链契约中信息租金参数的合理设定，可以实现供应链中交易双方的帕累托改善，并最终达到供应链中博弈的纳什均衡。 The paper begins with supply chain operational model and basic hypothesis, and analyzes the transaction process in the supply chain. It compares both transaction parties＇ profits under the condition of the retailer revealing the market demand＇ s signal and not revealing it, and shows the supplier will gain more profits after achieving information sharing the in the supply chain. Afterwards, the paper puts forward the necessary condition which spurs the retailers to share demand information in the supply chain. By designing rationally information rent parameter on the supply chain contract, both parties in the supply chain will attain Pareto Improvement. In the end, the game in the supply chain will obtain the Nash balance.

关 键 词： 供应链 契约 信息成本 信息共享 激励

分 类 号： [F253.9]

领　　域： []