作　　者： ;

机构地区： 电子科技大学中山学院

出　　处： 《技术经济与管理研究》 2020年第2期30-36,共7页

摘　　要： 市场竞争优势获取的重要因素取决于企业的技术创新能力,而技术创新投资则决定了技术创新能力的高低。本文在结合技术创新决策的不确定性、不可逆性和竞争性,利用期权博弈方法构建了政府资助下的双寡头企业技术创新投资策略模型。考虑到政府资助对技术创新的促进作用,根据不同投资时机企业得到的政府资助差异,指出政府资助使企业技术创新投资临界值降低,且资助额越大,投资临界值越低。然后通过不同投资策略投资临界值的分析,得出不存在政府资助及存在政府资助两种情境下企业技术创新投资策略的变化,即:由于政府对不同技术创新投资时机的企业资助额不同,使得企业在到达领先者投资临界值之后和到达追随者投资临界值之前都有可能做出投资决策,而在没有政府资助的情况下理性的企业不可能选择在此区间内同时进行投资。 Technological innovation ability is an important factor for enterprises to gain competitive advantages in the market,while investment in technological innovation determines the level of technological innovation ability.Combined with the uncertainty,irreversibility and competitiveness of technology innovation decision-making,the method of option game is utilized to construct the investment strategy model of technological innovation for duopoly enterprises funded by government.Considering the positive effect of government funding on technological innovation,this paper,in accordance with the differences in government subsidies for enterprises at different investment opportunities,points out that government subsidies reduce the critical value of investment in technological innovation,and the larger the amount of subsidies,the lower the critical value of investment.Then,through the analysis on different threshold of investment strategies,the changes in technology innovation investment strategy of enterprise is obtained under the two conditions of government subsidy and without government subsidy.Namely,owing to the different government subsidies for enterprises at different investment occasion of technological innovation,it is possible for enterprises to make investment decisions after reaching the investment threshold of leaders and before reaching the investment threshold of followers,while it is impossible for a rational enterprise to invest simultaneously in this interval without government subsidies.

关 键 词： 技术创新 投资决策 期权博弈 政府资助

分 类 号： [F273.1]

领　　域： []