作　　者： ;

机构地区： 电子科技大学中山学院

出　　处： 《系统工程》 2015年第9期52-57,共6页

摘　　要： 由一个传统零售商和一个拥有电子渠道的制造商组成的双渠道供应链,双方存在斯塔克伯格博弈;当突发事件导致市场需求、生产成本以及渠道替代系数同时扰动时,通过供应链扰动管理理论和博弈论的方法求出了集中决策下双渠道的最优价格、渠道销量以及供应链利润,同时设计了收益共享契约协调多因素扰动时的双渠道供应链。研究表明：当双渠道供应链面临多因素扰动时,供应链存在一定的鲁棒区域;在鲁棒区域内,多因素扰动并不影响制造商的生产决策,但是会影响渠道之间的产品分配;采用收益共享契约可以有效地协调多因素扰动下的双渠道供应链。 A one-manufacturer-one-retailer supply chain is studied in this paper,in which the manufacturer has an electronic channel and the retailer has a traditional channel.A dual-channel supply chain is constructed in this scenario and the manufacturer is the leader of this Stackelberg game.Some disruptions happen after the manufacturer makes the production plan,which makes the market demand,the production cost and alternative channels change simultaneously.The optimal sales price,channel sales quantity and the whole profit of the supply chain are given in the centralized decision by using supply chain disruption theory and game theory.A revenue-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain when the disruptions happen.Result shows that：（1） there exists some robustness area in the dual-channel supply chain when the multi-factorial disruptions occur;（2） product distribution rather than production plan is affected by the disruptions in the robustness area;and（3） the revenue-sharing contract can effectively coordinate the dual-channel supply chain when multi-factorial disruptions occur.

关 键 词： 收益共享契约 双渠道 多因素扰动 博弈论

分 类 号： [F274]

领　　域： []