作　　者： ;

机构地区： 暨南大学

出　　处： 《经济社会体制比较》 2012年第4期195-204,共10页

摘　　要： 在我国,地方官员间的晋升竞争和行政权力所带来的地下经济收益,都会导致地区性行政垄断的出现。地区性行政垄断变量因而会受到GDP、地方财税水平等政绩指标和企业经济指标的影响,并在OLS回归估计中表现出内生性问题。文章构建了一个省级面板数据计量模型,以工具变量法对地区性行政垄断的区域经济绩效及其内生性问题进行实证检验。结果发现：地区性行政垄断损害了4个方面的区域经济绩效——生产效率、资本配置效率、技术创新能力以及国际竞争力。由于地区性行政垄断这种地方官员行为在一定程度上内生于经济系统,以往常用的OLS估计可能会低估地区性行政垄断的危害性。 In China, competition for promotion among local government officials and the illegal economic gains that come from administrative power have led to regional administrative monopolies. The variable of regional administrative monopolies can be affected by local GDP, the local government＇s fiscal and tax revenue, and the economic performance of enterprises. Endogenous problems appear in existing empirical studies. Using the regional administrative monopoly index （Yu Liang-chun and Yu Dong-hua） and ＇ China＇s large and medium-size industrial enterprise data set＇ , this paper builds a panel data model and uses the instrumental variable method to conduct empirical tests. Result shows that Chinese regional administrative monopolies damage enterprise production efficiency, capital allocation efficiency, technological innovation capability and international competitiveness. Because of endogenous problems, the OLS method could underestimate the harmfulness of regional administrative monopolies.

关 键 词： 行政垄断 地区性行政垄断 工具变量法 面板数据模型 经济绩效

分 类 号： [F423.3]

领　　域： []