作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东工业大学管理学院

出　　处： 《数学的实践与认识》 2018年第17期12-25,共14页

摘　　要： 通过综合考虑横、纵向公平偏好,运用委托代理理论,构建激励顾客参与创新的数学模型,不仅将模型从2个代理人扩展至多个,还完善了单边维度公平偏好下顾客参与创新激励模型.通过模型求得顾客参与创新的有效时间、最优激励契约以及企业期望净收入.研究表明,企业雇佣高公平偏好顾客可增加顾客参与创新的有效时间.当企业可以观测到顾客参与创新的有效时间时,企业设置的绩效报酬系数应随顾客纵向公平偏好程度的增大而提高;当企业不能观测到顾客参与创新的有效时间时,若顾客整体的创新能力较高,企业设置的绩效报酬系数应随顾客横、纵向公平偏好程度的增大而降低,否则,企业设置的绩效报酬系数应随横、纵向公平偏好程度的增大而提高. In this paper, in order to encourage customers to take part in innovative ac- tivities, we build a mathematical model by using principal-agent theory on the basis of considering both horizontM and vertical equity preference. We not only develop the model from two agents to n agents, but also improve the incentive model of customer innovation based on the unilateral equity preference. By solving the incentive model, we obtain the model results about optimal effective time, optimal incentive contract and enterprise＇s ex- pected net income. Then we explore the relationships between these model results and equity preference. This research shows that （1） firms employ the customers with high equity pref- erence which helps to increase the effective time of customer innovation. （2） When firms can observe the effective time of customer innovation, the incentive coefficient set by firms should be raised with the increase of horizontal equity preference. （3） When firms can＇t observe the effective time of customer innovation, if the whole innovation ability of all customers who participate in innovation is strong enough, the incentive coefficient set by firms should be reduced with the increase of horizontal and vertical equity preference; in other words, if the whole innovation ability is weak enough, the incentive coefficient set by firms should be raised with the increase of horizontal and vertical equity preference.

关 键 词： 顾客参与创新 激励 委托代理 横向公平偏好 纵向公平偏好

分 类 号： [F272.92]

领　　域： []