作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东金融学院

出　　处： 《经济管理》 2009年第5期56-64,共9页

摘　　要： 本文结合前景理论和委托代理理论，以上市公司为样本深入分析了管理层风险偏爱、薪酬激励与企业R＆D投入三者之间的关系。研究结果表明，管理层风险偏爱的两维度风险倾向和风险认知均与R＆D投入显著正相关，从而验证了管理层的风险偏爱是影响企业R＆D投入水平重要因素的假说；另外，薪酬激励对R＆D投入有显著效应，且短期激励的效果比长期激励更好，意味着当前我国企业管理层最为关注的是短期报酬，而长期激励对R＆D投入并无显著影响。本文还发现，薪酬激励在管理层风险偏爱与R＆D投入两者之间发挥了调节变量的作用，这表明，作为“经济人”的管理层，薪酬激励制约着风险偏爱与R＆D投入两者的关系。 The study incorporate prospect theory and agency theory, based on Chinese listed companies, analysis the relationship among management risk preference.compensate incentive and R＆D investment with SEM models. It concluded： the two dimension of risk preference , both of risk propensity and risk perception are position with R＆D investment, it means risk preference is a important factor impacting management R＆D investment decision; Short-term incentive are better than long-term incentive, longterm stock incentive had no use for R＆D investment; Compensate incentive displayed a moderate role between management risk preference and R＆D investment, it means as a economical man, compensate incentive determined his working hard level and restricted the relationship between risk preference and R＆D investment.

关 键 词： 风险偏爱 薪酬激励 R&D 调节变量

分 类 号： [F272.3]

领　　域： []