作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东财经大学

出　　处： 《重庆理工大学学报：社会科学版》 2014年第9期29-36,共8页

摘　　要： 皮尔斯指出溯因或溯因推理（abduction）是不同于归纳和演绎的第三种推理,然而皮尔斯对溯因概念的定义是模糊的,于是便出现溯因悖论：溯因既属于归纳又不属于归纳。本文基于贝叶斯方法对归纳的理解和处理,考察了当代两种典型的消解溯因悖论的路径,即辛提卡区分定义性规则和策略性规则的措施,以及利普顿的IBE理论。指出这两种路径均是行不通的,而贝叶斯方法却可以容纳溯因性归纳和溯因,从而消解溯因悖论。 Charles S.Peirce argued that abduction is a third kind of reasoning,different from both deduction and induction.However,Peirce’s concept of abduction is ambiguous,which results in the paradox about abduction：on the one hand,abduction is distinct from induction;one the other hand, abduction belongs to induction.Based on the Bayesian analysis on induction,two typical approaches, Hintikka’s distinction between definitory rules and strategic rules and Lipton’s inference to the best explanation （IBE）,are discussed respectively in this paper.As a result,the analysis shows that the paradox about abduction can not be eliminated by the two typical approaches but can be eliminated in Bayesian framework which can contain abductory induction and abduction.

关 键 词： 溯因 最佳解释推理 贝叶斯方法 归纳 演绎

分 类 号： [B81]

领　　域： []